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Children develop in a real, messy world in
which learning unfolds through time and
space shared with others. Understanding
how children develop in this com-
plex environment will require a solid,
theoretically-grounded understanding of
how the child and environment interact—
both within and beyond the laboratory.
We as researchers understand the scientific
value in testing children in carefully-
controlled environments, but for our
findings to have any impact on children’s
lives we must strive to understand how the
processes we study in the lab operate in the
real, busy environments in which children
interact with peers and adults.
Categories, like children, do not exist in
isolation. Consequently, category learning
cannot be easily separated from the learn-
ing context—nor should it be. According
to a systems perspective of cognition and
development, categorization emerges as
the product of multiple factors combining
in time (Thelen and Smith, 1994). Here
we illustrate this multicausality by con-
sidering the who, what, how, where and
when of categorization. In this paper, we
include many different types of behav-
iors under the umbrella term “catego-
rization.” To be as inclusive as possible,
we consider any case in which a partic-
ipant responds to how stimuli may be
grouped as evidence of category learn-
ing. This includes studies of word learning
(generalizing a label from one instance to
another), looking preferences (to stimuli
from different familiar groups), and play
(exclusively touching instances from the
same category). The variety of tasks that
relate to category learning exemplifies the
importance of this fundamental process to
a broad range of behaviors outside the lab.
You may notice in these examples
that we have not included children’s ages
because, according to a systems view,
research should not be about age per
se. Our goal is not to create a catalog
of milestones; our goal is to understand
the cognitive mechanisms driving change.
Therefore, we focus on the developmental
level of the child. Obviously, age must be
taken into account in experimental design
because age is generally (but not per-
fectly) correlated with developmental level
(e.g., appropriate motor responses differ
for a 2-year-old vs. 2-month-old). Our
point, however, is that we will learn more
about category learning if we stop ask-
ing questions such as “how do prototype
representations compare between 6 and
8 months of age?” and focus instead on
the underlying learning mechanisms, e.g.,
“what causes prototype representations to
change?”.
WHO IS INVOLVED IN LEARNING
In the real world children learn through
play and independent exploration (Hirsh-
Pasek et al., 2009). However, in the lab
children are seldom alone. This is impor-
tant because children adjust their learning
depending on who is providing informa-
tion (e.g., the same or different experi-
menter, Goldenberg and Sandhofer, 2013;
human or robot, O’Connell et al., 2009;
mom or dad, Pancsofar and Vernon-
Feagans, 2006). Children are also oppor-
tunistic and will look for any signal of
what the right answer is. For example,
children will track who is present when
they hear a new word (e.g., Akhtar et al.,
1996), whether the speaker has provided
reliable information before (e.g., Jaswal
and Neely, 2006) and whether a question is
repeated (e.g., Samuel and Bryant, 1984).
Thus, who is involved in learning mat-
ters both for learning in general and for
category learning specifically. Moreover,
who the child is also matters. For exam-
ple, children with larger vocabularies more
flexibly categorize the same stimuli on
multiple dimensions (Ellis and Oakes,
2006; Horst et al., 2009); right-handed
participants are more likely to associate
“good” with right and “bad” with left
(Casasanto and Henetz, 2012); and female
participants learn phonologically-familiar
novel words better than male participants
do (Kaushanskaya et al., 2011, 2013).
WHAT IS BEING CATEGORIZED
All categories are not created equal:
categories vary in complexity and within-
category similarity (Sloutsky, 2010).
Where children draw boundaries between
categories is influenced by category
(object) properties, including distinc-
tive features (Hammer and Diesendruck,
2005), number of common features
(Samuelson and Horst, 2007; Horst and
Twomey, 2013), visual cues to animacy
(Jones et al., 1991), the presence of cat-
egory labels (Sloutsky and Fisher, 2004;
Plunkett et al., 2008) and the presence
of other objects (e.g., identical or non-
identical exemplars Oakes and Ribar, 2005;
Kovack-Lesh and Oakes, 2007).
In naturalistic environments, categories
are often ad hoc and flexible (Barsalou,
1983). For example, the category “toys
to pick up before bed” may be discussed
every day, but each day it may include
different items. Furthermore, the process
of categorizing objects is not independent
of the objects themselves: different objects
may be more or less flexibly assigned to
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different categories depending on the con-
text (Mareschal and Tan, 2007) and infor-
mation available (Horst et al., 2009). Thus,
in order to understand the process of cat-
egorization, researchers must ensure that
the results they find in the lab are not too
closely tied to the specific stimuli.
WHERE CATEGORIES ARE
EXPERIENCED AND TESTED
We know that environment matters
because there are significant effects of
household chaos (Petrill et al., 2004),
excessive classroom decorations (Fisher
et al., 2014) and environmental noise
(for a review see, Klatte et al., 2013) on
children’s cognition. Where a child lives
impacts what social categories they learn
and the category choices they make. For
example, Black Xhosa children in South
Africa prefer own-race faces if they live
in a primarily Black township, but prefer
higher-status race faces if they live in a
racially diverse city (Shutts et al., 2011).
Furthermore, where children live interacts
with who they are: only infants from the
statistically dominant race show “own-
race” face preferences; infants from the
minority race show no race preference
(Bar-Haim et al., 2006).
In the lab, location matters both in
terms of where the child is and where the
stimuli are. For example, children aremore
likely to learn names for non-solid sub-
stances if introduced to the gooey items in
a familiar highchair context (Perry et al.,
2014). Children also benefit when learn-
ing and testing contexts are the same
(Vlach and Sandhofer, 2011) and when
stimuli locations are stable across naming
instances (Samuelson et al., 2011).
HOW ANDWHEN CATEGORY
LEARNING IS PROBED
Different tasks support different types of
category learning. For example, yes/no
questions lead to a stronger shape bias
than forced-choice questions (Samuelson
et al., 2009), various types of feed-
back differentially affect learning cate-
gories with highly salient features vs. less
salient features (Hammer et al., 2012)
and highly variable category members
facilitate category name generalization
(Perry et al., 2010) whereas less variable
category members facilitate category name
retention (Twomey et al., 2014).
Categorization does not reflect static
knowledge; rather, category learning
unfolds over time and is a product of
nested timescales. Children (and adults)
are constantly learning: experimenters’
distinction between learning vs. test trials
is arbitrary with respect to the processes
that operate within the task (McMurray
et al., 2012). That is, learning continues
even on test trials—in fact, participants
may not realize the shift from learning to
test trials. Consequently, different behav-
iors are observed depending on when
during the categorization process category
learning is assessed (Horst et al., 2005).
Category learning is a product of
nested timescales including (a) the cur-
rent moment (e.g., how similar the stim-
uli are on the current trial, Horst and
Twomey, 2013), (b) the “just previous”
past (e.g., what happens during the inter-
trial interval, Kovack-Lesh and Oakes,
2007; whether stimuli on the first test trial
are novel or familiar, Schöner and Thelen,
2006; and trial order effects Wilkinson
et al., 2003; Vlach et al., 2008) and
(c) developmental history (e.g., vocabu-
lary level, Ellis and Oakes, 2006; Horst
et al., 2009; Perry and Samuelson, 2011).
Because children’s behavior is never solely
the product of a single timescale it
is impossible to create an experiment
that taps only into category learning in
the moment or only knowledge children
brought to the lab. Each timescale is part of
the time-behavior interaction. For exam-
ple, Kovack-Lesh et al. (2008) demon-
strated that 4-month-old children’s ability
to form a category of cats that excludes
dogs is not due only to comparison (i.e.,
looking back-and-forth, in the moment)
or having a pet at home (developmental
history), but is due to the interaction of
both factors.
UNEXPECTED INFLUENCES
If researchers view categorization as static
knowledge, then neither the when or
how should matter. Many researchers hold
this view, which purports experiments are
designed to test what a child knows upon
arrival at the lab: trial order and trial types
are largely trivial. However, as the exam-
ples we provided collectively illustrate, the
impact of seemingly “nuisance factors” are
not just noise in the data; they are “unex-
pected influences” that change behavior in
predictable ways and can provide insights
into the underlying processes of learn-
ing and generalization. Small variations
in what children experience during cate-
gory learning can have dramatic impact
on how they form categories (e.g., sequen-
tial vs. simultaneous presentation, Oakes
and Ribar, 2005; Lawson, 2014) and differ-
ences in testing contexts can lead to indica-
tions of what has been learned (Cohen and
Marks, 2002). Thus, it is vital to acknowl-
edge the impact of such unexpected influ-
ences if we want to understand how cate-
gorization unfolds over time.
Subtle experimental design decisions,
such as the number of test trials to include,
may not seem theoretically significant,
but they can have profound effects on
children’s behavior. As dozens of studies
illustrate, “boring” factors like counter-
balancing and stimuli choice during both
learning and testing can have a profound
effect on findings, including trial order
(Wilkinson et al., 2003), how many targets
(Axelsson and Horst, 2013) or competitors
(Horst et al., 2010) are presented, or the
color of the stimuli (Samuelson and Horst,
2007; Samuelson et al., 2007). For exam-
ple, how broadly participants generalize a
category label depends on where the exem-
plars are presented and if the exemplars
are visible simultaneously (Spencer et al.,
2011). In particular whether more or less
diverse examples occur in the first block
of trials influences later generalization
(see Spencer et al., 2011, Supplementary
Materials). A result like this sheds light
onto the generalization process: deciding
how broadly a category should be applied
depends on the timing of experience with
exemplars (see Oakes and Spalding, 1997;
Samuelson and Horst, 2007, for similar
findings).
Unexpected influences may not be
of immediate theoretical interest to a
given experimenter, but they are still
often informative—even at times vital—
to the underlying processes at work
(e.g., the influence of novelty on chil-
dren’s selection is informative for under-
standing how prior memory influences
current learning). Experimental designs
should manipulate these types of factors
as independent variables whenever pos-
sible. We recognize this can be imprac-
tical with populations that are costly to
recruit, in which case such factors may
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be controlled for statistically, for example
with item-level analyses.
OUTLOOK
Category learning unfolds across both
space and time, and small differences at
one moment (e.g., shared features among
the stimuli; whether exemplars are identi-
cal) can create a ripple of effects on real
behavior. Behavior emerges from the com-
bination of many factors, including those
not explicitly manipulated or controlled
by the experimenter. To understand what
causes developmental changes in behavior,
we must also acknowledge and understand
the processes through which these fac-
tors (sometimes unexpectedly) influence
behavior in our tasks, including at short
timescales. However, just as it is important
to acknowledge these unexpected influ-
ences, we must not fail to see the forest
for the trees. If a behavior such as category
learning can only be captured in an ideal
environment under carefully-controlled
conditions, how much can we generalize
to the contexts in which learning typically
occurs? Theoretical accounts that neglect
the rich influence of context in real time
are too narrow to be applied outside the
lab (Simmering and Perone, 2013). What
we as researchers are ultimately trying to
understand is how learning occurs in a
real, cluttered world across time and a
variety of contexts. Consequently, a solid,
theoretically-grounded understanding of
cognitive development will require under-
standing how the child (or adult) and
environment interact. Only then will our
theories be both comprehensive enough
and sufficiently specific to reliably pre-
dict behavior and potentially intervene to
prevent adverse outcomes.
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